context, 6 I will thus be telling a story about law and literature, in the tradition of legal storytelling begun by the law-and-literature movement itself. 7 My story, in turn, will demonstrate how capacities for reading and telling stories can be similar, and yet very different, within law and literature.
This Note presents the media incident surrounding Rushdie's publication of The Satanic Verses as a parable for the coexisting proximity and distance between literature and law. Part I factually situates the parable by summarizing the legal action within the incident and the novel that instigated it. Part II suggests that the Rushdie incident speaks authoritatively about law and literature because it can itself be understood as a complex literary narrative constrained by its own uncomfortably trial-like, bipolar medium.
Having established a parabolic strategy of reading, this Note goes on to read the Rushdie incident for its lessons about the law-literature boundary. First (as discussed in Part III), the incident demonstrates that legal pronouncement, when based on the reading of a literary narrative, may do violence and injustice to literary meaning. The editing and reordering of evidence necessary to achieve any legal pronouncement means, when the "evidence" is literary, that reading in the literary sense must be compromised or authoritatively simplified into trial-like side taking. Second (as discussed in Part IV), the Rushdie incident implicates an author who had previously aspired to make his fiction a quasi-legal instrument of political and social change, but who, upon success, insists that politically opinionated fiction should not be the same as politically motivated action for purposes of legal condemnation. The visible material effects of The Satanic Verses make Rushdie's assertion of literature's quasi-legal power believable; yet equally believable are his later caveats about fiction's limitations as lawmaker. Finally, the incident pinpoints a further discrepancy between law and literature (discussed in Part V) by underscoring the different conceptions of authorial intention assumed by a "multivoiced" literary novel and by the "univocal" legal society that condemns it. It nonetheless remains difficult to draw a lesson of law-literature discrepancy from the Rushdie incident, since "pluralist" championing of novelistic multivoicedness within a multicultural state appears to reconcile law and literature, albeit with some limitations. Furthermore, "fundamentalist" [Vol. 104: 2213censure of Rushdie's novel can be understood in its own terms as a differing literary sensibility. The Rushdie incident thus argues both for and against the law-literature relationship, its categorical stationings of law and literature being indistinct, nuanced, erratically convergent and divergent. At once example and troublesome counterexample, the incident comes to stand for a certain paradox, factually retold, at the heart of law-and-literature scholarship. Whether it relates to such scholarship in a paradigmatic or parasitic fashion is therefore predictably undecidable.
I. "DIE HE OR JUSTICE MUST": 8 A BRIEF PARSING OF THE RUSHDIE INCIDENT

A. Legal Responses to The Satanic Verses
When Rushdie wrote The Satanic Verses, he was not a stranger to the "business end" of his frequently offended readership. His dangerous roman 6 clef career, beginning with Midnight's Children, had already earned him a lawsuit in the High Court of London from then Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi, for one of that book's many thinly veiled and insulting references to Gandhi and her family. 9 Rushdie's next book (Shame), flippantly fictionalizing more than one generation of Pakistani politicians, had angered those among them who were still alive.' 0 When The Satanic Verses was published in September 1988, Rushdie "expected that the mullahs wouldn't like it."" The profusion of legal activity against the book in the few months after its publication was nevertheless surprising. General protest without the color of law ubiquitously legitimated legal interposition, if not the exact legal action taken.' 2 On October 5, 1988, the Indian Finance Ministry announced a ban on the novel, adding that the ban did not detract from the novel's literary and artistic merit.' 3 Other countries, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, South Africa, See Sri Lanka, and Sudan followed the Indian government by instituting their own bans.' 4 In December, the Islamic Defence Council in London held a protest rally, and on January 14, 1989, Muslims in Bradford, Yorkshire, burned a copy of The Satanic Verses in public. 15 On February 12, 1989, approximately 2000 protesters stormed the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, attacking police with stones and bricks; five protesters were killed when police opened fire on them. 6 On February 14, 1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran pronounced a fatwa (religious sentence) 7 on Teheran radio, sentencing to death Rushdie and all involved in the publication of his book "who were aware of its content," and promising heaven and martyrdom to all who would die in implementing the sentence. 18 The text of the fatwa, though clearly expressing a sentence against blasphemy or apostasy,' 9 is noticeably unspecific about exactly how the book breaches law and therefore gets some of its legal force contextually, from the months of more specific public protest preceding it.
9.
As a legal pronouncement against literature, thefatwa must have begun in some kind of "reading" or "interpretation" of literature, but hermeneutic faculties are subordinated in the final pronouncement to judgment. Despite its religious veneer and its arguably questionable interpretation of Islamic law, 2 it is as much a legal proclamation as a religious one. Indeed, the categories of law and religion conflate in Islamic law, as this excerpt from Khomeini's elaborate post-fatwa message of February 23, 1989, shows:
Salutations to those who rushed forward to discover the inner meaning of jurisprudence, and became sentinels to their nation and community .... However overbearing and authoritarian, all legal response against The Satanic Verses actually relates to the literary text as both master and slave. Judgment is subservient to the extent that it must ground itself in the novel, though judgmental "reading," even in good faith, characteristically crosses into forcible misreading.
1988) [hereinafter
B. The Novel and How It Offends
The Satanic Verses is a precarious collection of overdetermined stories so uncontainable that they overflow into one another; in uncanny ways they even overflow into and circumscribe the terms of the ensuing incident. The central narrative begins with two men-Gibreel Farishta, dream-tormented schizophrenic 27 and sometime anxious religionist turned disbeliever, 28 a larger-than-life cinema idol from the excruciatingly melodramatic "theological" genre of Hindi films; 29 and Saladin Chamcha, 3° a British-educated Indian living in England, called the "Man of a Thousand Voices and a Voice" by virtue of his television and radio advertising background, 3 ' and therefore, importantly, also an actor. "[A]ctors are not people, ' 32 muses Chamcha at the beginning of the novel, foreboding Farishta's metamorphosis into an angel and Chamcha's own transformation into fiend, complete with bestial horns and hooves. Bedeviled by his own appearance, Chamcha is taken by the English police for an illegal immigrant, beaten and manhandled, ending up in a hospital with other migrants, themselves transformed into mythical creatures. 33 The full implications of this devil-angel dichotomy are complex, and Rushdie's prose often requires an intimate familiarity with the innards of subcontinental culture and the rhythms of subcontinental speech. Nevertheless, Chamcha is being "punished" for his migrant status, for his betrayal of the authenticity and traditionalism essential to a false sense of continuity with the past, whereas .Farishta is being rewarded for his ineptly formulaic embrace of this same rootedness.Y 27. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1, at 83; see also SALMAN RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS 393, 398 (1991) ("His greatest torments... [are] in the form of dreams.").
28. See RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1, at 21-22 ("He grew up believing in God, angels, demons, afreets, djinns, as matter-of-factly as if they were bullock-carts or lamp-posts .... Sometimes, though, he caught himself in the act of forming blasphemous thoughts .... "); id. at 29 ("[lit became clear that he had ... lost his faith.").
29. See id. at 24-29. 30. The name is shortened from "Salahuddin" to rhyme with "Aladdin," whose story reverberates through Saladin's in significant ways. 42 second, it is clear that Gibreel/Mahound, not Satan, are responsible for "both the statement and the repudiation" of the satanic verses; and third, it is suggested that Mahound later invents the diabolic origins of the satanic verses to mask the truth. 43 In the story of "Ayesha," ' the novel continues a general preoccupation with overpowering femininity that is ultimately traceable to the central conflict between Allah and the three female deities from the satanic verses. Ayesha, a young prophetess (and namesake for Muhammad's/Mahound's favorite wife), is inspired by the Archangel Gibreel to lead her followers into the Arabian Sea, which will miraculously part and convey them to Mecca. The story borrows from an actual incident in Karachi in the early 1980's, when several pilgrims willingly drowned themselves behind a Shiite woman promising to lead them to the holy city of Kerbala in Iraq. Associating a figure of popular superstition with the Prophet's favorite wife means, to Muslim readers, profaning Ayesha's name. 45 Some also inferred a sly aspersion on Islam, and religion generally, as derivative of and culminating in fanaticism. 46 The brothel episode dreamed by Farishta 47 is perhaps the most potently offensive. Prostitutes in a brothel in Jahilia (the fictional equivalent of Mecca) improve their business when they take on the names and manner of the Prophet's twelve wives. They are eventually executed for their actions, but the damage, from the point of view of Muslim readers, has undeniably been done.
Condemning Rushdie for The Satanic Verses requires deciding whether or not fiction is a factitious cover for malicious diatribe. The answer is far from easy, but no straightforward diatribe could have offended more easily. The Satanic Verses is everywhere alive to its own meaning, profaning with in SACRILEGE, supra note 40, at 65, 67 ("Mis detractors anglicise his name to Simon Rushton."). But see Empowered and sustained by the media, the Rushdie incident is a media production. 48 Because it so palpably regards legal reception of literature, it must have some commonsensical relevance to the law-and-literature movement. Furthermore, partly because it is a media production, the incident itself is at once like literature and like law (or "trial").
The manner in which the media has presented and debated the Rushdie incident is trial-like. Trials, one can say without overreaching, often serve cultural purposes, cathartic or otherwise. 4 9 Publicized trials may have an element of the theatrical, dramatizing adversaries to ascribe mythic or symbolic values to events. In such large-scale productions of cultural meaning through legal process, the media's participation as medium is understandably thick.
To be sure, media intervention, no matter how trying for people and ideas in the public eye, does not automatically amount to a legal trial. The Rushdie incident itself is not a grand confrontation between free expression and fundamentalism in some officially capable and international legal forum-even if it is undoubtedly peppered with isolated applications of legalistic rhetoric." The apparent inability of pluralism and fundamentalism to meet on common legal ground has to do with jurisdictional and political feasibilities in contemporary international order. To the extent that this failure to universalize law is a function of discursive disparities between "East" and "West," it has similarities with what Sara Suleri identifies as the "essential alegality" and "radical obsolescence [of law]" in colonial discourse, i.e., with the failure of colonial regimes to legitimize themselves in the legal precedent of either Western colonizer or Oriental colonized. 5 ' 48. Indeed, the fatwa itself derives its particular ability to sentence from media dissemination. I use the present and present perfect tenses to describe the Rushdie incident in the belief that. for both Rushdie and his punishers, the incident remains almost as relevant in the present as it was six years ago. Cf. Henry 
-).
51. SARA SULER, THE RHETORIC OF ENGLISH INDIA 55-56 (1992). Suleri finds, upon reading the trial of Warren Hastings, that Hastings' accusers were rhetorically compelled to differentiate their own legal authority from Hastings' pernicious use of colonial power to ill effect; else the colonial enterprise itself would have been inculpated in Hastings' apparent irrationality. The source of their anxiety was that siding against Hastings also meant siding against their own rational legal order. It seems reasonable to wonder whether Suleri's reading might apply to other jurisprudence that answers historical examples of prejudiced [Vol. 104: 2213 But in another sense, if Rushdie and his adversaries are not actually on trial in the Rushdie incident, they nevertheless might as well be. Like a trial, the Rushdie incident pares down individuals and ideas with internally complex, ambiguous life stories to produce wieldy but simplistic plaintiff-defendant oppositions. 52 Like a trial, it appears to be a cultural mechanism that replaces and cheats complex cognition with facile, authoritative differentiation. Still, the Rushdie incident is a trial-by-media; judgment within it is effectively dissipated through scattered, nonauthoritative texts. But the dichotomous categories necessary for quick (perhaps unjust) judgment nonetheless control meaning and derive authority in aftereffect. Adversarial antagonism between fundamentalist condemnation and pluralist protection of free speech remains a prominent interpretive key to the incident. Yet, not only are there differences within Islamic law, 53 and not only is Khomeini's interpretation contestable within Islamic law itself, 54 but the tradition of heretical literature within Islam (and public tolerance of it) dates back at least to the ninth century. 55 Nor is The Satanic Verses collapsible into a version of antireligious free speech, because Rushdie's intention from the beginning has apparently been just the opposite: to get inside what it means to have religious experience, instead of providing an easy "secular sneer., 56 adjudication by rigorously privileging universally applicable neutral principles over the kind of openly ideological articulation of law that could theoretically both legitimate and counteract existing inequities. See id, at 53 ("The lie of the impeachment proceedings is thus its failure to admit that Hastings' misdeeds were merely synecdochical of the colonial operation, that to assume that such governorship could take more palatable form was to allow Burke to have his cake of astonishment and to eat it, too."); cf. Samuel P. 
").
56. See PIPES, supra note 9, at 55; SALMAN RUSHDIE, "In God We Trust", in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS, supra note 27, at 376, 376 ("Tqhe rationalism of... [literary realism] comes to seem like a judgment upon ... the religious faith of the characters being described."); French, supra note 34, at 43, reprinted in THE RUSHDIE FIL, supra note 6, at 7 ("'I don't believe that angels appear and talk to people. On the other hand, revelation seems to me to be genuine."' (quoting Rushdie)); cf. Slaughter, supra note 14, at 201 (noting "irony" in similarity between Rushdie's project as writer and Muslim resistance to liberalism); Sara Suleri, Contraband Histories: Salman Rushdie and the Embodiment of Blasphemy, 78 YALE REV. 604, 606-07 (1989) (finding that, in reinstalling sacred and profane as relevant categories, The sense of "trial" that follows from a commonsensical, perhaps liberal, 7 idea of "law" implicates a ritualistic, case-by-case legal process, where opposing sides are allowed to present their stories under formal constraint. This sense of trial fails to describe the Rushdie incident, for in legal pronouncements against the novel, neither Rushdie nor his detractors have been given a meaningful equivalent of prejudgment due process." Where a trial imports an expected constraint and rhythm, 59 the Rushdie incident is disruptive precisely because the international impact of Iranian legal interpretation has been so unconstrained and unexpected.
On the other hand, a trial has a wholeness that allows it to contain differing narratives under one organizing principle. The same has been said about "law," and could be said about the manner in which the Rushdie incident contains its component narratives:
[T]he whole of law is the production of one narrative after another.... [E]ach individual focus ... will have unique features that set it apart. Nevertheless, the unity of law as a discursive enterprise will be the primary element of narrative and will lie at the center of arguments over the point of law. 6 0 Structurally, containment implies misrepresentation of the individual components in the composite final product, and in the Rushdie incident, the media is the visibly responsible culprit for any disparities between popular perceptions and literary or legal realities. Misrepresentation may not mean complete falsification and need not call for paranoic resistance to the media. Rather, misrepresentation by the media means mythification of historical truth into cultural meaning. 62 When "mediated," the primary legal and literary texts within the incident emerge as more distinct and one-sided than close reading or historical explanation reveals. Rushdie himself has banally participated in Rushdie has written "a deeply Islamic book," and that Rushdie's blasphemy should be -reread as a gesture of reconciliation toward the idea of belief").
57. According to Bruce Ackerman. constrained dialogue (of the sort trials replicate) ts (or should be) the defining principle for the "liberal" way of organizing conflict. See [Vol. 104: 2213 this simplistic typology, becoming in turn the secular free-speech advocate 63 and the devout convert to Islam. 64 Both of these self-contained postures seem utterly inadequate compared to the novel's redoubling ironies, its dexterous avoidance and complication of every possible stance or meaning that might be ascribed to it. 65 In keeping with Charles Baudelaire's conception of irony, 66 the novel refuses any kind of dialectical progression from naive to wellconsidered positions, laughing at fool and philosopher alike as a way of asserting the inauthenticity of both without sanctioning any particular alternatives. When Rushdie's novel taunts, jeers, or laughs, it does not laugh from a position of greater wisdom; rather, it questions the very possibility of wisdom. The subsequent media version of "Rushdie," in a mockery of justice to his own novel, simply alternates between more or less laughable roles.
As a consequence, sides are taken very easily in the Rushdie incident, even where neither side was neatly one-sided ex ante. Sara Suleri writes that "[t]he internal dangers of [The Satanic Verses] are ... externalized, or rendered unto Iran." 67 No doubt the "internal dangers" of the Islamic side are also externalized within the incident into an opposing "free speech" camp. Thus, if Barbara Johnson is right to say that characteristic of legal judgment is the forcible transformation of internal ambiguity (or "differences within") into more adjudicable "differences between," 68 and if the function of "trial" is to accomplish this differentiation into opposing sides, then the media-created Rushdie incident is like "trial" in a very important sense. If so, then the simplistic typology of the media incident may derive from the constraints on a legal trial imposed by the local generic forms available to speakers' and observers' consciousness and subconsciousness. Because culture has to be ready for the story told by a trial, it influences, often by the literary genres it has already absorbed, the kind of story that the trial ends up becoming. ' Of course, when many generic forms are available (given an international and not a local community trial), 70 generic simplification is not necessarily prefigured, unless media representation itself is constrained by internal generic pressures, which it very well might be. What Sara Suleri calls "journalistic oppositions between fundamentalism and secularism" 7 I are partly just that-journalistic oppositions. Even if the medium is not the message, it at least affects the message. But usual journalistic opposition is compounded in the Rushdie incident, and trial metaphors within it bespeak greater truths about what the incident itself means for the nature of legal, and not just journalistic, understanding. Being "trial-like," the incident stands only tropologically for trial and judgment on Rushdie and Islam, but as a metaphor for law, it is telling and powerful.
Moreover, trial-form narratives like the Rushdie incident may take representational cues from available literary narratives and genres-the genre of postmodern satire (as exemplified by Rushdie, Pynchon, 7 and others) being among those available in this case. But the capacity for selection from available forms may be constrained by a genuinely different logic. As a legal narrative, the Rushdie incident simplifies "differences within" The Satanic Verses (as well as other texts) to produce dramatic but inaccurate oppositions. The result is a visible generic difference from the central literary narrative, a difference that comes across as gross simplification and bad faith.
Yet the Rushdie incident is also like a literary narrative in its uncanny, almost methodical repetition of the same issues at stake in The Satanic Verses-whether an idea compromises when weak and tolerates when strong, 74 whether the profane has not a parasitical but an essential relation to the sacred as the Orient to the Occident, 7 ' and so on. The media incident and the book are often thematically indistinguishable, the literary narrative evidently so overdetermined that it has determined its own reception. As Rushdie observed, the characters in the novel are "struggling with just the sort of great problems that have arisen to surround the book.
7 6 Passages from The Satanic Verses occasionally even acquire a discomforting prescience in hindsight.Y 7 When "life imitates art," the processes by which "life" is manufactured may themselves be artful. One author expresses the common feeling that the "dialogue between Rushdie and the infuriated Muslims, which has now been broadcast internationally, and in which the boundaries between fiction and reality are almost totally obliterated, may be read as the most compelling, though unwritten chapter of the novel. 78 But even if the incident repeats the complicated issues raised in the book, it repeats them simplistically, within a more trial-like setting. As such, it presents interpretive issues too strenuous for the cognitive and representational capabilities of its own medium, and enacts a difficult marriage between law and literature that makes it relevant to any scholarly enterprise positing an essential or potential rapprochement between the two. A casualty of this strange admixture is that the task of reading the incident as a whole seems both deceptively simple and unnecessarily complex. Legal and literary tropes both succeed too well in describing the Rushdie incident; as a result, they also narrate the uncertainty at their mutual disciplinary boundaries.
If the Rushdie incident is itself a media-created, trial-like "legal narrative," it is not merely collapsible into the legal or legalistic narratives (e.g., thefatwa and Indian ban) it contains-just as it is not collapsible into The Satanic Verses. The incident only derives its particular authority as law-and-literature parable by being, in itself, both legalistic and literary. Yet, the incident also repeats the logic of its texts, for what it reveals is a similar interaction between the primary legal and literary narratives it contains, meaning a simplification and an appropriation for indecorous ends that each side effects on the other when it speaks on its own. The law and literature within the Rushdie incident are therefore both alike and at odds. Sometimes indistinguishable in power and when you're strong, are you tolerant?").
75. See RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at 401 ("I sought images that crystallized the opposition between the sacred and profane worlds.").
76. Id. at 394. 77. See, e.g., RUSHDIE, THE SATANIc VERSES, supra note 1, at 272 ("The film was to be ... the story of the encounter between a prophet and an archangel . . . . But would it not be seen as blasphemous .... "); id. at 374 ("Your blasphemy, Salman, can't be forgiven. . . . To set your words against the Words of God."); id. at 545-46 ("Salahuddin was thinking... about how he was going to die for his verses, but could not find it in himself to call the death-sentence unjust."); cf RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, supra note 27, at 407 ("S]iome passages in The Satanic Verses have now acquired a prophetic quality that alarms even me.").
78. Simawe, supra note 55, at 189-90; cf Marlena G. Corcoran, Salman Rushdie's Satanic Narration, 20 IowA REv. 155, 158 (1990) ("In The Satanic Verses,] we find inscribed versions of the very controversy over sacred and profane writing which has so colored the reception of the book."). effect, they nevertheless compromise each other-law simplifying literature to achieve legal pronouncement, 79 literature overstating its quasi-legal powers to compete with law.8° The remainder of this Note will explicate the various compromises at the law-literature boundaries within the Rushdie incident.
I1. READ ALERT: LITERARY NARRATIVE AS NARRATIVE EVIDENCE
Simplification is necessary for legal pronouncement against The Satanic Verses because "reading" for legal purposes is different from reading for literary purposes. As far as relative conceptions of reading are concerned, the Rushdie incident is a parable for a terrible gap between law and literature. All the legal narratives within it are conclusory, and because they must use a literary narrative as evidence for their conclusions, they compromise literary reading to align literary narrative toward their own teleological ends, even when it is resistant to such realignment.
The best way to compromise literature is not to read it, or to paraphrase it.
8 ' Literary understanding is impossible without a minimal submission to the literary medium, the text itself. Not surprisingly, the early stages of the media incident showed Rushdie copiously chiding his critics for not having read his book. 8 2 "It is not.., the book it has been made out to be," he wrote in a 1990 essay, "that book containing 'nothing but filth and insults and abuse' that has brought people out on to the streets across the world. That book simply does not exist."
3 Some of Rushdie's distress was clearly coming from different reading priorities: "It has been bewildering to learn that people... have been willing to judge The Satanic Verses and its author, without reading it .... It has been bewildering to learn that people do not care about art.... He went on to provide a plot summary from his viewpoint, intended to "replace the non-existent novel with the one I actually wrote," ' knowing nevertheless that the reading priorities were unbridgeably far apart, and that legally potent simplifications had irretrievably influenced the tone of the rest of the media controversy:
There are times when I feel that the original intentions of Typical of the Muslim rejoinder to Rushdie's initial protests was that of Syed Shahabuddin, Muslim MP in India:
Yes, I have not read it, nor do I intend to. I do not have to wade through a filthy drain to know what filth is. My first inadvertent step would tell me what I have stepped into. For me, the synopsis, the review, the excerpts, the opinions of those who had read it and your gloatings were enough. 88 Shabbir Akhtar, spokesman for the Muslim community in Bradford, 89 repeated the point bluntly, using an analogy nothing short of stunning:
[I]t is not a necessary condition of having knowledge of a work that one should have read it, any more than it is necessary for a judge to witness a murder in order to pass judgment. The ordinary Muslim went by the verdict of those trusted religious and other learned authorities who had read the whole book, much as a judge goes by the evidence supplied by eye-witness accounts. 9 0 Not reading, it seemed, was the peculiar province of law. 91 Instead of being hearsay, authoritative reading had preemptive and precedential value, as both a "verdict" already rendered and the paraphrastic "eyewitness" evidence behind dissipated companion verdicts. Authoritative reading also signified, quite appropriately, something like reasoned trial; but the principle for later interpretation was deferential, in the sense that subsequent trial and judgment could risk referring back respectfully to the original. Despite Rushdie's anxious reminders that the novel's irony was not directed against religious faith, or that the profanity was mouthed by unreliable characters and therefore not expressive of authorial intention,' many Muslims remained unconvinced. 9 There are very good arguments that a close reading of The Satanic Verses would (and did) produce just as much offense as no reading at all. Assuming, however, that a close reading would yield different judgments (as Rushdie's frustration suggests), reading for the purpose of legal condemnation obviously 87. Id at 403. 88. Shahabuddin, supra note 13, at 39. 89. See supra text accompanying note 15. 90. AKHTAR, supra note 20, at 40. This passage is almost more interesting for the imperfections in the metaphor. Note that the judicial "verdict" has already been passed by "religious and other learned authorities" before the case reaches the "ordinary Muslim" judge.
91 be like literature in that it has good use for narrative-a legal pronouncement is usually backed (or should be) by a story, a historical explanation based on the evidence at hand."°° As J. Hillis Miller puts it, "the just application of the law depends on getting a story straight about what happened .... The appeal to precedent in law means, most often, the appeal to an agreed-upon
But what the Rushdie incident seems to show is that it is not enough, in establishing a law-literature rapprochement, to say that law makes use of narrative, because different kinds of narrative make all the difference in the world. For legal narrative, the relevant question in the Rushdie incident is evidentiary in character-how should evidence be read and reconstructed to support the legal narrative legitimating the legal judgment that draws from this evidence? This kind of reading may have an antithetical relation to reading in the literary sense, especially when the evidence to be read is itself a literary narrative. Though judgments about literary reading are matters of opinion, the Rushdie incident shows that law can do injustice to literature by misrepresenting it, by imposing on literature a distant, other logic. The word "justice" itself, like the word "representation," has both aesthetic/mimetic and politico-legal meaning.'O° As Pygmalion, we look for justice in perfect likeness, in a simulacrum that "does justice to" (or tells the truth about) something else. 0 3 As King Oedipus, we may even have to do justice to ourselves for the burdens of statecraft." 4 If Akhtar's analogy'°5 is extended, however, legal judgment demands interruption and rupture of literary narrative by an other, mediating interpretive narrative that acquires authoritative evidentiary status by re-emplotment and even replacement of the original literary evidence. Justice requires doing injustice to literature.
Yet, the process of constructing coherent legal reality by censoring, subordinating, and highlighting portions of the evidentiary corpus is itself artistic. Constructing a story from an amorphous mass of evidence requires creativity, even inspiration. It may involve censorship in a general sense-parts have to be cut out, other parts emphasized. But literary narratives are themselves guilty of suppressing in order to tell. As the narrator of Shame, one of Rushdie's earlier literary works, puts it, "And now I must stop saying what I am not writing about, because there's nothing so special about that; every story one chooses to tell is a kind of censorship, it prevents the telling of other tales." ' 6 The same applies to legal narrative, as Clare Dalton writes (with specific reference to contract doctrine):
The telling of [doctrinal] stories-like the telling of any story-is, in one sense, an impoverishing exercise: The infinitely rich potential that we call reality is stripped of detail, of all but a few of its aspects. But it is only through this restriction of content that any story has a meaning.
0 7
Every story must censor to keep its thread and make its point, as also must, in slightly different ways, sentences and words-a cat is called a cat in part to keep it from being identified as a tiger,' 08 a man called a man to keep him from being called a giant. 1 0 9 That there is something artistic about constructing a story from what Dalton calls "the infinitely rich potential that we call reality" seems undeniable. The construction of historical reality from historical evidence is what Hayden White has called the literary or "fictive" aspect of history making,"° insomuch as meaningfully emplotting a set of data with ambiguous meaning is itself a primary creative act. The only problem, according to White, is that a set of data can be emplotted in many different ways."' Where no emplotment suggests itself as the superior or correct one, the historian's dilemma is that the story she tells seems like one among many plausible stories that could be told from the same data. There is not enough resistance from the facts.
For White, the process of documenting history is thus literary because historical facts are never enough in themselves to make "history." Similarly, if legal judgment can and should be backed by historical, narrative explanation," 2 then construction of legal reality from evidence may be one of the most literary aspects of lawmaking. 4 becomes a problem of multiple possible reemplotments. Even if religiously defined legality chooses a different reemplotment from the one chosen by "liberal" or "public will" legality, the latter will also necessarily re-emplot and compromise the existing literary narrative-accordingly, free speech arguments in the Rushdie incident seem equipped only to misuse and simplify the novel's intimate concern with religious belief. No doubt the legal re-emplotment of literature requires an aggressive reading of literature, possibly even aggressive enough to be a nonreading. The Rushdie parable teaches that even if law-and-literature scholarship uses "narrative" as a law-literature connecting principle, production of legal narrative may depend on a compromising of literary reading. Such compromise means reconstruction of and violence to literary evidence, though this reconstruction itself is a creative, almost literary act. If law is capable of functioning as a sobering reality principle against literature's overextended reach, then the relationship between law and literature defies any idealistic or transcendental conciliation. Somewhere in the law-literature boundary, there is a frictional resistance; assimilation cannot come without nonideal transaction costs." 5 Nowhere else is this resistance so foregrounded in a difference between law and literature as where law has to pass judgment on literature.
IV. LITERATURE AS QUASI-LEGAL INSTRUMENT
Despite this difference, the similarities between literature and lawmaking are also eerily foregrounded as perhaps nowhere else in the Rushdie incident and in Rushdie's roman a clef career generally. In one sense, this is obvious. Rushdie's literature affects people's material lives, just as law does. Pdople 113. To be sure, part of the evidentiary corpus justifying legal and nonlegal condemnation of Rushdie has nothing to do with his literary narrative. One seemingly objective source, for example, takes a personal jab: "Rushdie... has also been mobile with his women." "Simon Rushton" aka Salman Rushdie, supra note 41, at 67.
114. See supra text accompanying note I 11. 115. Cf. Godzich, supra note 109, at xii-xiii ("The term resistance means a property of matter recognized since antiquity: its perceptibility to touch and inertial opposition to muscular exertion.... take offense when writers refer to them or their religious heritage explicitly and disparagingly under the guise of fiction. Other writers besides Rushdie have marked society in a similar fashion." 6 Political fiction (like some of Rushdie's earlier work) treads on especially dangerous ground when it offends in this manner. It can function just like a rival government. In a further sense, such fiction actually competes with the official story, even with history-and since law itself may compete with history by relying on fact-based evidentiary narratives that reread the facts for law's own purposes," 7 such fiction also competes with law. This Part shows that Rushdie has always aspired to write fiction that competes with history and law in precisely these terms. Yet he has also occasionally emphasized the limitations on fiction imposed by its own fictionality, even if, according to some, he later overused fictionality to predicate polemical retreat after he was placed in a defensive position. While the Rushdie incident powerfully demonstrates that fiction is quite up to the task of competing with law, the fact-fiction disjunctions that Rushdie highlighted after thefatwa are equally valid. Therefore, the assertion of literature as quasilegal, taken in the strongest possible sense, requires a misunderstanding of law's very different material origins and effects.
If law characteristically reinscribes history for its own ends, then Rushdie's fiction claims quasi-legal status in the same way that J. Hillis Before the fatwa, Rushdie had already abstracted this habit of competing into an aesthetic of turf warfare. Rushdie's literature was to relate to history (and, implicitly, law) as a rival, undertaking to remake history in its own normative image. Because writers and politicians both "try to make the world in their own images," Rushdie wrote in 1982, "they fight for the same territory," and therefore, "literature can, and perhaps must, give the lie to official facts."'" 2 In his 1984 essay Outside the Whale, Rushdie posited "literature" as a quasi-legal instrument of social construction and change, and in fact, as just that which can decide the historian's dilemma" z by providing a superior, more correct story about reality:
The modem world lacks not only hiding places, but certainties. There is no consensus about reality between, for example, the nations of the North and of the South. What President Reagan says is happening in Central America differs so radically from, say, the Sandinista version, that there is almost no common ground. It Outside the whale is the ... continual quarrel, the dialectic of history. Outside the whale there is a genuine need for political fiction, for books that draw new and better maps of reality, and make new languages with which we can understand the world. 2 4
Nothing succeeds like success. Apparently, literature can make its competing picture of the world more effectively than Rushdie had bargained for. As Edward Said has since suggested, if the above-quoted passage says that writers of fiction cannot be "insulated from history and politics," then it applies to Rushdie's later predicament in an "ominously prophetic," ironic manner. 12 Outside the Whale, however complex and self-aware it may be, is neither ironically intended nor esoterically coded. Yet it is plainly capable of meaning more than its author can handle. Later incredulous about responses to The 122. SALMAN RUSHDIE, Imaginary Homelands, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS, supra note 27, at 9. 14. 
").
125. Edward W. Said, Statement at Public Meeting , in THE RuSHDIB FILE, supra note 6, at 164, 164. Satanic Verses,' 26 perhaps Rushdie had not mastered the full import of his own categories before writing; perhaps he had failed to anticipate the kind of material consequences at stake in law, history, and politics.
Such a reading has to be qualified in one obvious way. If Outside the Whale constatively establishes that "literature is like law" (as opposed to "literature is law"), it already implies the further qualification that literature is also not like law-apples are like oranges only because they are also not like oranges, otherwise they would simply be oranges. Moreover, even if Rushdie overstated the case for quasi-legal fiction in Outside the Whale, he was not unaware, even then, of fiction's genuinely fictional objectives. In a 1983 response to disgruntled readers of Midnight's Children, he wrote that they "wanted... [Midnight's Children] to be the history, even the guidebook, which it was never meant to be ... [and] were judging the book not as a novel, but as some sort of inadequate reference book or encyclopaedia."', 7 Later, he pressed a similar defense in aid of The Satanic Verses. "I am not trying to say," he wrote in 1990, "that The Satanic Verses is 'only a novel' and thus need not be taken seriously . . . ."' But, to say that ... literature and politics ... fight for the same territory ... is very different from somehow knowing, in advance, that... the conflict your work seeks to explore is about to engulf it... and you.
... Fiction uses facts as a starting-place and then spirals away to explore its real concerns, which are only tangentially historical. Not to see this, to treat fiction as if it were fact, is to make a serious mistake of categories.
129
That is, political fiction and political action should not be the same for purposes of legal condemnation.
Rushdie had essentially stated, even before thefatva (though in response to already simmering protest), that The Satanic Verses was not about to compete with history and law in the strong sense. In an interview shortly before thefatwa, he said, "The one thing you learn as an historian is just how fragmented and ambiguous and peculiar the historical record is. So I thought, In fact, Rushdie's shifting commitments to politics and imagination are too easily characterized as opportunistic reactions to opposition. The terms of his nonfictional self-defense after thefatwa are indeed more simplistic, binary, and facile than The Satanic Verses itself.' 33 His uncharacteristic fervor about fictionality is clearly defensive, and his implication that fiction and action merit different legal treatment is essentially a justification for liberal free speech protection of a novel that, on its own terms, probably denies the rationalist (if not moral) certainty undergirding arguments for free speech. 134 Had The Satanic Verses been able to speak to Rushdie after thefatwa, it would have certainly told him to stop making sense. But it is a mistake to see this enforced simplification as Rushdie's compromise, prompted by the incident. If anything, the "compromise" preexisted its own incidental exposure. The author's feeble progression from overstatement of literature's powers to overstatement of its limitations is better understood as a coexisting affinity and gap between law and literature, as an ability in both to compromise and to dominate the other. Rushdie did state literature's abilities too expansively, but literature's legal and political powers, its ability to effect material consequences, compete with and compromise law, are visibly impressive. If Rushdie went on to overstate literature's limitations and different priorities, literature nevertheless does have these limitations, even when it changes people's lives as profoundly as it did in this case.
V. MULTIPLE VOICES IN LAW AND LITERATURE
Part Im showed that the paraphrasing/misreading/not-reading of literature necessary to achieve legal pronouncement in the Rushdie incident is a special case of, or a parable for, the simultaneous affinity and divergence between law and literature. Since many close readers were no doubt also offended by The (1990) (chastising Rushdie for rediscovering "naive faith" in expressibility or identifiability of authorial intention in order to proclaim "good faith" intentions); cf RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES, supra note 1. at 427 ("Mhis sounds, does it not, dangerously like an intentionalist fallacy?").
134. For a discussion of disparities between The Satanic Verses and the free speech arguments later used to justify it, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Satanic Verses,
135 the law and literature within the Rushdie incident also require another comparison: specifically, a comparison of their relative conceptions and accommodations of authorial intention. As this Part shows, the Rushdie incident contributes to a sharp sense of difference between novelistic literature and fundamentalist legality in terms of their relative conceptions of authorial intention-the former allowing authorial intention to be diluted into and overpowered by contesting voices within the novel; the latter demanding, even imposing ex machina, a fully intending, univocal author'3 who can be held responsible.
As this Part also shows, certain "pluralist" responses to thefatwa seem to trivialize this law-literature opposition by championing literary multivoicedness as befitting a perfectly pluralist, multicultural legal society. But these arguments reconcile law and literature at three unseen insincerities. First, semaphoring novelistic multivoicedness into legal protection of cultural diversity is playing fast-and-loose; it reappropriates "differences within" a literary work (in the form of contesting voices) to legitimate a legalistic sanctioning of certain "differences between" people. 37 As such, it also simplifies and censors literary objectives for its own purposes. Second, to the extent that pluralist legal society is not perfectly pluralist and pluralist ideals do not match real conditions, the seeming law-literature marriage can justifiably be said to mask a battle of ideologies (secular vs. fundamentalist), a conflict of laws so to speak. Third, the "law" that even pluralist society relies on might have historical and conceptual attachments to a quasi-religious authoritarianism.
Finally, this Part argues that the putative law-literature opposition forefronted in the Rushdie incident might also be understood as a struggle between competing literary ideologies, since Islamic legal society perceives little difference between the categories of law, religion, and literature. If Islamic religious texts and the legal narratives that derive authority from them are themselves self-consciously literary texts, then the nature of the lawliterature opposition in the Rushdie incident obviously requires rethinking.
A. Traces of "Rushdie" in Rushdie's Novel
Fiction comes with the disclaimer that it may be unreliable when compared to a Michelin guide. As Rushdie peevishly replied to those who had found historical errors in Midnight's Children, "It is ... obvious, I hope, that Saleem 135. Cf. PIPES, supra note 9, at 113. 136. By "fully intending, univocal author," I mean one who conveys her intent through fictional voices (characters or narrator, for example) that serve largely as mouthpieces for this one intent (hence the word "univocal"). Though this irreverence appears to be coming directly from "Salman Rushdie," however, the "free will" of characters to do and say as they please can apply to the first-person narrator as well. In fact, the passage plays with this very uncertainty, and arouses the reader precisely by inviting her to look who's talking. Even the final doubt about who actually is the responsible devil ("Me?") has doubtful authorial origin.' 43 Many offended close readers (as well as nonreaders) responded to the assertion of authorial distance and dispassion by arguing that it was only a trick to disguise actual blasphemous intent. Indeed, the greater the authorial distance, the greater then seemed the author's craftiness. Often, such readers [Vol. 104 
B. The Bakhtinian Novel
This relentless search for authorial intention in narratives that legitimate hostile legal pronouncement against Rushdie suggests that fundamentalist legal proscription is at odds with novelistic literary narrative. The novel, according to the going conception, is the genre in which multiple, competing voices each get their "day in court" before a largely impartial, or at least not immediately positionally identifiable, author. As the narratologist Mikhail Bakhtin has popularly been taken to mean, the novel, unlike the lyric poem, is the genre in which authorial voice can be overtaken by competing, variously untrustworthy voices, while the "negatively capable"'"" author suspends sidetaking.' 49 The novel is "dialogic," because voices compete within it through intersubjective dialogue, without any particular subjectivity necessarily privileged as representative of the authorial voice. Not surprisingly, several of Rushdie's defenders (including Rushdie himself) either mentioned Bakhtin or took the Bakhtinian line in situating the novel within the incident.'5 Of course, the vision of fiction as preferably positionless already compromises Rushdie's earlier argument that fiction should take sides. And, undoubtedly, an author entertaining blasphemous stances within a novel without adopting them can still be foreseeably offensive. In that sense, Rushdie's retreat behind Bakhtinian principles may be a questionable defensive tactic. But on the other hand, even side-taking fiction, by virtue of its literariness, may imply a different kind of authorial intentionality than that with which the law normally concerns itself.
In literary critical terms, the implications of Bakhtinian writerliness for Rushdie's intentionality are legion. Multivoicedness has the obvious sense of multiple characters and voices, with no voice clearly representative of the author. In authors like Rushdie, multivoicedness carries the related sense of ironic double talk (multiple voices within a single speaking voice), where characters and author say or allow to be said the opposite of what they mean, with sarcastic effect-this is what literary critics might call a betrayal of selfmimesis in false repetition, a consistently deadpan or sardonic renunciation of sincerity. More generally, this kind of writerliness implies an ironic tone, which Rushdie's work certainly has. ' If ironic double talk and a persistently ironic tone mean that what is stated cannot be trusted to have been sincerely stated, it is also important to recognize that in Rushdie's fiction, just as in many other ironic literary works, disdain for what has been stated does not make it easier to identify authorial position in a determinate "unsaid." Rather, the more fitting model for Rushdie's fiction is Wayne Booth's description of multiple ironies canceling each other out and ending as positionlessly as they started.' 52
C. Consequences of Bakhtinian Multivoicedness
The question of Rushdie's intentionality is thus different depending on whether intentionality is at stake for a narrative justifying legal judgment or for a narrative of literary criticism. Bakhtinian multivoicedness is aesthetically pleasing to a literary critic but either nonassimilable or incomprehensible for purposes of fundamentalist legal pronouncement. The hostile response to The Satanic Verses represents a failure to read irony as innocent because expressive of authorial distance. This may be a characteristic of law generally. Early American courts also refused to recognize any ambiguities in ironic posturing, The apparent law-literature opposition in the Rushdie incident thus seems a merely contingent one. If only pluralist society could match its own pluralist ideals, the argument is, there would be minimal legal encroachment on freedom of literary expression. There is much to be said in favor of this proposed law-literature union. Where it is actualized, writers and artists do have a greater degree of psychic and expressive freedom in some sense.
The first problem with this defense of Rushdie, to the extent that it sees artistic ambiguity legitimating or repeating societal heterogeneity, is conceptual. Bakhtinian literary dialogue and ambiguous artistic expression only parallel democratic relations between people in a trivial manner, if at all. There is thus no essential reason why they should be especially fitting in a democratic state.' 66 Bakhtinian dialogism is not Bruce Ackerman's "constrained liberal dialogue" 1 6 7-interpreting it as such can mean doing violence to its literary purpose. A certain kind of writerliness cannot be translated without cost into a certain kind of legalism. Authorial intention may be too dissipated in a novel to be retrievable at all. If it is retrievable, the ultimate end of intersubjective dialogue within The Satanic Verses is not to organize rational power relations between liberal subjects, but, arguably, to question liberal assumptions about individualism and free, detached selfhood. 16 8 There is no reason to think that this kind of novel is an intellectual mimicry of the multicultural, liberal state, any more than there is reason to think that liberal dialogue borrows from novelistic literary sensibility. Even if pluralist principles guarantee toleration of Rushdie's book, the book itself might be a substantive critique of the basis for liberal selfhood. Carlos Fuentes and others 169 may defend Rushdie in terms of the novelistic ideal, but pluralist protection of Rushdie does not have much to do with reading literature.
Second, to the degree that pluralism is not actualized in modem pluralist societies, Muslims may be justified in objecting to selective pluralist arguments. ' In principle, it is not a blow to the pluralist law-literature reconciliation to say that pluralism is often not fully effected in pluralist regimes.71 But the realpolitik lapses exposed by the Rushdie incident show significant remnants of univocalism in a legal structure that purports to tolerate multivoiced literature. Most egregiously, the absence of black-letter First Amendment principles in Britain"' means that statutes and common law criminalizing blasphemy remain, and more astonishingly, that they continue to offer official protection to the Christian religion only. 73 By republicizing this inequity, the Rushdie incident drew direct Muslim protest against British blasphemy law, t74 occasioned a seminar on English blasphemy law organized by the Commission for Racial Equality and the Inter-Faith Network of the United Kingdom, 75 and incited a spate of new works proposing reform 176 and even abolition'" of English blasphemy law. Third, as the condition of English blasphemy law intimates, secular regimes, even if they officially relegate religious belief to a private sphere, may be indebted both historically and ideologically to religion. If pluralist regimes are not so deracinated from religion as to be innocent of univocal authoritarianism, some conflict between law and Bakhtinian writerliness is systemic even in pluralist legal society. The history of American blasphemy law shows that secular and religious conceptions of social order have been frequently indistinguishable. 78 A "secular purpose" doctrine allowed early American courts to avoid the First Amendment and uphold blasphemy laws when they were found necessary to preserve the neutral secular order.' t 9 While this doctrine no doubt enabled politically popular decisions, it also evinced some actual inability to divorce legal order from religious authoritarianism. One case made a telling connection between blasphemy law and "secular" public oath taking."' Later, blasphemy statutes were applied to cases of garden-variety swearing where obscenity/profanity prosecution would have been more congenial.' 8 ' As Harold Berman has written, law shares with religion the need to ritualistically dramatize social values "to induce an emotional belief in them as a part of the ultimate meaning of life.
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Formalistically, a certain piety can continue to color the way in which law understands authorship and intentionality. Just as earlier American courts often failed to read ironic double talk as innocent because expressive of authorial distance,"' current copyright doctrine, in its liberal but uncomfortable approach to parody, shows what George Marcus calls a "reverent conception of authorship that treats it as a timeless and natural category of social identity."' ' Reverence for authorship also means that authorship stands above community-it cannot be diluted by Bakhtinian interaction with other voices. Thus, Richard Serra precedes his plea for the appropriateness of ambiguous artistic expression within a heterogeneous society'" with a criticism of the Yates Amendment (denying federal money to obscene art)'1 for espousing the very heterogeneous standards he goes on to applaud. Indeed, this plea for homogeneously applicable (and not multiculturally sensitive) legal rules is the basis for his defense of Rushdie: "[In the Yates Amendment] [tihe decision about whether something is obscene is to be made by a local jury, applying community standards. Does this mean that the material in question can be tolerated by one community and another community will criminalize its author? What about Salman Rushdie?"' 87 "Occupation" in the hostile sense,1 95 however, is precisely what is otherwise distressing about the Rushdie incident, for in it, law and literature seem to have transgressed jurisdictional boundaries to effect unholy seizures of foreign territory. A comfortable integration of the two categories cannot nullify the apparent discomfort each causes the other when demarcating its own proper province. Exactly where the Rushdie incident leaves law, literature, or "law and literature" thus remains oddly elusive.1%
195. But cf. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3 (1993) ('The law of occupation developed as part of the law of war. Initially. occupation ... was referred to... as 'belligerent occupation.' But the history of the twentieth century has shown that occupation is not necessarily the outcome of actual fighting ... and it... could be the product of a peace agreement.").
196. "For many people," said Rushdie a few years after the fanva. "I've ceased to be a human being. I've become an issue, a bother, an 'affair."' Rushdie, One Thousand Days in a Balloon. supra note 64. at 16. As an exposition of the Rushdie incident in terms of law and literature, this Note itself risks becoming another inconsequential abstraction. Yet, what prompted it was the humanity of all who were hurt in the Rushdie incident, including Rushdie himself. Interpretation, whether literary or legal, usually has an agenda. and this Note is no different. Relevant normative preferences had best be acknowledged as such, though anything stated comes with an inevitably richer body of the unstated.
I am and have been a "Rushdie fan." I cannot dismiss the Muslim reaction, though I do not know whether I would not have dismissed it without the catalytic fatwa. Some of the reactions strike me as expressions of genuine pain. It is not for me, just as it is not for Rushdie. to prescnbe how people should make it possible for themselves to live; I do not feel qualified in the least to make that prescription. Nevertheless, my agenda, as far as I know, was to make visible again a reading expenence that. for me. felt far from malicious or hurtful--of course. I stand open to correction. There is a sharpness in Rushdie that can offend, but people do preoccupy him, and when he writes about them. this reader at least has seldom felt the absence of something very close to tenderness. Perhaps that means he lets people off too easily.
As an explanatory genre, tragedy no longer comes without internal difficulties, whether one participates in the tragic design as authorial puppeteer or ignorant puppet. The Satanic Verses is a tragedy that struggles to emerge, that self-consciously confines its tragic moments, makes fun of them. cuts them to pieces. It is hard to say after finishing the book that tragedy, however momentarily luminous, has won over irony. But there is still as much love in the book as there is hate. This is what makes it difficult for me to forget the Rushdie incident.
